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Abstract 
 The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry announced recently that they will 
terminate preferential treatment in the licensing of specific chemical products for export to South Korea. 
This announcement evoked concern that the impact on Korean semiconductor and electronics industries, 
which rely heavily on imports from Japan, might cause a serious supply shortage in the global 
semiconductor market. To assess the economic impact of tighter export controls, this study simulates: (a) 
imposition of an export tax on chemical products; and (b) a productivity decline in the electronics sector in 
Korea, using a world trade computable general equilibrium model. The results of these simulations indicate 
that such a productivity decline would cause only slight harm to the Japanese and world economies, aside 
from the electronics sector in Korea, and that an export tax would significantly distort trade patterns and 
undermine the welfare of Japan and Korea in a similar magnitude. However, welfare loss normalized for 
GDP size would be far smaller in Japan than in Korea. 
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1. Introduction 
 In July of 2019, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (2019) 
announced that they would tighten implementation of export controls under the Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Act and would terminate preferential treatment in the licensing of specific chemical products, 
(fluorinated polyimides, hydrogen fluoride, and photoresists) for export to South Korea. These chemical 
products are essential intermediate inputs in the Korean semiconductor and electronics industries. Korea’s 
dependency on imports of fluorinated polyimides, hydrogen fluoride, and photoresists from Japan has been 
as high as 94, 92, and 44%, respectively (Yang and Park (2019)). The METI announcement evoked concern 
that a disruption of the supply of those intermediate inputs could stall the output of the relevant Korean 
industries, affecting export supply and prices globally, as Korea accounts for 75% and 45% of global 
DRAM and NAND flash supply, respectively (Yang and Park (2019)). 
 Trade conflicts occur not only in traditional sectors such as agriculture and garments, but also in 
high-tech industries including semiconductors. For example, in 1980s and 90s, supercomputer exports were 
one of the major issues in US-Japan trade conflicts, and in 2018-2019 the US banned the use of 
communication devices made by Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE. Many trade conflicts have been 
brought about by the US; as it attempts to reduce its large trade deficits with these countries. There was 
also a trade conflict between Japan and Korea over high-tech industry issues: the Japanese government 
imposed countervailing duties on imports of DRAMs made by Hynix under subsidy by the Korean 
government between 2006 and 2009. 
 These actions against freer trade can be seen as a reversal of economic integration—whether they 
take the form of tariff or nontariff measures, motivated by national security reasons or political economic 
reasons. Similar problems can be seen globally, such as the UK’s departure from the European Union (EU) 
(a.k.a. Brexit), renegotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the last moment 
withdrawal of the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. General equilibrium models 
(including computable general equilibrium (CGE) models) have found use as a powerful tool for assessment 
of such instances of economic integration and de-integration. For example, using a GTAP-based CGE 
model, Kawasaki (2017) conducted alternative scenario analyses of US departures from existing and (at 
that time) ongoing regional and global trade deals. A number of studies have assessed the impact of Brexit, 
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both before and after the UK referendum (e.g., PwC (2016), Dhingra et al. (2017), Hosoe (2018), and Jafari 
and Britz (2018)). These general equilibrium analyses quantified impacts of various instances of economic 
de-integration in detail, focusing on industrial output, trade, and consumer benefits by country, and from 
the results identified implications for policy making and evaluations. 
 This study follows the above strand of the literature, applying a CGE model to examination of 
the expected impacts of trade barriers between Japan and Korea. It should be noted that this study only 
quantifies the economic impacts of trade de-facilitation; it does not examine either the economic benefits 
of de-facilitation or its contributions to tighter export controls on chemical products with the potential for 
misuse in areas such as weapons manufacture—a concern voiced in METI (2019). We conduct a 
hypothetical simulation of the effects of tighter export controls in two cases: (a) a tax imposition on 
chemical exports to Korea and (b) a productivity decline in the Korean electronics sector owing to increased 
uncertainty and inefficiency evoked by the resumption of export controls. Our policy simulations 
demonstrate the extent of production and welfare losses in Korea and Japan that would arise and the extent 
to which global trade would be affected. 
 However, we can hardly predict the impact of such trade de-facilitation policy in terms of 
changes in quality and quantity. We therefore hypothetically assume a 50% export tax imposition on 
Japanese chemical exports to Korea and predict the impact of that tax on output in the Korean electronics 
sector. For a clean comparison, in another scenario, we calibrate productivity decline, which is shown later 
to be 0.14% in order to reproduce the same output fall in Korean electronics as that brought about by 
imposition of 50% export tax. Through examination of these two policy simulation scenarios, we find that 
if a policy change takes the form of a total factor productivity (TFP) decline, aside from the output change 
in the Korean electronics sector, there will only be a small impact on output, trade, and welfare in Japan 
and the world economy. The other scenario, with export tax imposition, indicates a more serious outcome 
in welfare for both Japan and Korea. Despite the abovementioned concern expressed by producers and users 
of Korean electronics products, the international electronics market would not be affected substantially by 
either shock. 
 This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 below describes the CGE model used in these 
simulations. Section 3 explains our simulation scenarios and presents their numerical results. We conclude 
the paper in Section 4, mentioning limitations and future extensions of this study, and present policy 
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implications derived from our simulations. 
 
2. Model and Data 
2.1 CGE Model 
 We employ an extended version of the single-country static CGE model developed by Hosoe et 
al. (2010). The model distinguishes eight regions: Japan, Korea, East Asia (other than Japan and Korea), 
Southeast Asia, NAFTA, EU28, Latin America, and the rest of the world; and nine industrial sectors, 
including chemical and electronics sectors, which are of interest here.1 Each region uses capital, skilled and 
unskilled labor, and various intermediate inputs for production. Production technology is represented by 
constant-returns-to-scale functions, for simplicity. Departing from Hosoe et al. (2010), to describe a short 
run adjustment of economies we assume capital is not mobile across sectors. Both types of labor are 
assumed to be mobile. 
 Output is transformed into composite exports and domestic goods. The composite exports are 
further divided into exports to individual export destinations. For these transformation processes, we 
assume a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function. Similarly, imports from various source 
countries are aggregated to composite imports, which are in turn combined with domestic goods to produce 
Armington’s (1969) composite goods. For these aggregation processes, we assume a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function. Armington’s composite is used for consumption by a representative household 
and the government and for investment and intermediate input. The consumption goods purchased by the 
representative household are aggregated with a Cobb-Douglas type utility function, which measures welfare 
in each country. 
 
                                                          
1 Details of our aggregation pattern of GTAP sectors into our nine sectors are provided in the Appendix. 
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Figure 2.1 World Trade CGE Model 
 
Source: Modification of Hosoe et al. (2010, Figure 10.3)  
Note: For simplicity, this figure ignores uses of Armington’s composite goods. See Hosoe et al. (2010) for 
details of demand side and CES/CET functions. 
 
 The key model structures are: (1) the production function that links input and output; and (2) 
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of the domestic and foreign suppliers. For example, imposition of a tax on chemical exports from Japan 
pushes up the imported material price in Korea, which induces substitution of domestic materials for 
imported ones. Not only the price hike on imports but also the relatively costly domestic inputs increase 
the input costs of the Korean industry. This undermines competitiveness of the Korean industry in the 
domestic and global markets and reduces Korean output and exports. When a productivity decline hits an 
industry, a similar outcome to that of export taxes is expected, since the productivity decline would raise 
production costs and thus harm that industry’s output and exports. 
 Other modelling assumptions are as follows. Factor markets are assumed to be in full 
employment in each country; no international factor mobility is assumed. Current account deficits are fixed 
at the currency terms of the rest of the world. Walras’ law requests us to choose a numeraire and fix its price. 
For this, we choose unskilled labor and fix its wage rate for each country. Following Hosoe et al. (2010), 
Armington Composite 
Composite Imports 
Imports Imports 
Domestic Good 
Domestic Output 
Composite Exports 
Exports Exports 
Imports 
Value Added Intermediates 
Capital Skilled Labor Unskilled Labor 
Composite Imports Domestic Good 
Exports 
Composite Exports 
Domestic Output 
bo
rd
er
 
bo
rd
er
 
international trade 
international trade 
CES (2σ) 
CES (σ) 
CET (2σ) 
CET (σ) 
CES (σVA) 
Leontief 
Country A            Country B 
  Page 5 
government consumption and investment uses of goods are determined in proportion to the government’s 
total revenues and the total savings, respectively. Therefore, export tax revenues from the chemical trade 
between Japan and Korea are to be spent on government consumption and investment (through government 
savings); they are not to be transferred to the households.  
 
2.2 Data 
 We calibrate this CGE model to the GTAP Database version 10 (2014 benchmark year) with its 
elasticity parameters for trade σ  and for value added σVA  (Hertel (1997)). 2  However, the sectoral 
classifications used in the GTAP database are not as detailed as the commodity classifications used by 
METI (2019) to define chemical products subject to policy change. Similarly, the electronics sector of 
GTAP includes the semiconductor sector but also some other sectors. To make sectoral classifications 
consistent, one option is to split the GTAP sector down to the tariff code level before developing a CGE 
model. However, given the premature nature of the current export control policy change, we use the most 
detailed GTAP sectoral classifications for the chemical and electronics sectors as is, but focus on policy 
simulations. Nevertheless, to examine potential penalties of this mismatch qualitatively, we compare within 
sectoral classifications below. 
 Table 2.1 shows the sectors in the GTAP Database and the corresponding sectors in the Korean 
input-output (IO) tables in producer’s price (Bank of Korea (2019)). The three chemical products subject 
to the policy change should be included in the categories “basic chemical products,” “synthetic resins and 
synthetic rubbers,” and “other chemical products,” but many other products also fall in these categories. 
Similarly, “semiconductor and related devices” accounts for only 29% of the output of the GTAP electronics 
sector, which is called “computer, electronic and optical products” in the GTAP Database. 
 
 
                                                          
2 We use alternative elasticity parameter assumptions to confirm robustness of our simulation results with respect to 
the assumed parameters. Details are provided in the Appendix. 
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Table 2.1: Gross Output in GTAP Sectors and Korean IO Table Sectors 
GTAP Sector/Korean IO Table Sector mil. KRW 
% in GTAP 
Sector 
Chemical (GTAP)     
Basic chemical products 63,315,419  27.8  
Synthetic resins and synthetic rubbers 40,175,178  17.7  
Chemical fibers 3,388,906  1.5  
Fertilizers and pesticides 4,807,758  2.1  
Other chemical products 38,478,475  16.9  
Plastic products 62,630,815  27.5  
Rubber products 14,737,354  6.5  
    100.0  
Computer, Electronic and Optic (GTAP)     
Semiconductor and related devices 80,509,086  28.5  
Electronic signal equipment 65,827,406  23.3  
Other electronic components 23,636,299  8.4  
Computer and peripheral equipment 7,528,911  2.7  
Telecommunication, video, and audio equipment 75,333,738  26.7  
Precision instruments  29,378,121  10.4  
    100.0  
 
Source: Bank of Korea (2019) 2015 Benchmark Input-output Tables. 
 
 On the input side of the semiconductor sector, total chemical product inputs account for only 6% 
of total input (Table 2.2). This seems not to imply a serious impact of tighter export controls, unless 
chemical supplies are completely disrupted. The self-intermediate inputs have a large share, more than a 
quarter of total inputs. Import dependency of many intermediate inputs is high, reaching 40–80%, which 
implies high vulnerability to import disruption, especially when materials imported from other countries 
are hardly substitutable for those from Japan.  
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Table 2.2: Intermediate Inputs of Chemicals and Electronics by Semiconductor Sector 
  Input   Imported Input 
Korean IO Sector mil. KRW 
% of Total 
Input 
  mil. KRW 
% of 
Input 
Basic chemical products 1,413,163  1.8    935,850  66.2  
Synthetic resins and synthetic rubbers 605,789  0.8    375,469  62.0  
Chemical fibers 0  0.0    0  - 
Fertilizers and pesticides 12,865  0.0    527  4.1 
Other chemical products 2,892,236  3.6    2,247,059  77.7 
Plastic products 1,348,876  1.7    666,127  49.4 
Rubber products 12,725  0.0    5,106  40.1 
...          
Semiconductor and related devices 21,153,671  26.3    12,810,965  60.6 
Electronic signal equipment 3,719  0.0    1,749  47.0 
Other electronic components 3,255,321  4.0    867,005  26.6 
Computer and peripheral equipment 3,161  0.0    1,518  48.0 
Telecommunication, video, and audio 
equipment 
49,456  0.1    9,619  19.4 
Precision instruments  97,271  0.1    59,595  61.3 
Source: Bank of Korea (2019) 2015 Benchmark Input-output Tables. 
 
3. Simulations 
3.1 Two Simulation Scenarios 
 There is significant uncertainty as to how export control tightening affects the chemical and 
semiconductor sectors. We set up two scenarios to describe how export control tightening could affect the 
two economies. One scenario, an export tax scenario, assumes an export tax imposition on chemical exports 
from Japan to Korea, interpreting the policy change as a trade barrier. 
 The second scenario, a TFP scenario, assumes that the Korean electronics sector suffers a 
productivity decline due to increased uncertainty or inefficiency in production. To make material supply 
secure, producers may need to find alternative, less competitive suppliers outside Japan and/or increase 
their stockpiles as a buffer against temporary supply disruptions. In production planning, they may be forced 
to set conservative targets. These effects can be described as a TFP decline. As we cannot predict which 
type of effect will arise, we simulate both to model differences between the two. 
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 The magnitude of these effects is also unknown. With observed data, we could measure tariff-
equivalents of the trade barriers by estimating a gravity model, and productivity decline by estimating a 
production function. As we have no observations, in the export tax scenario we assume a hypothetical 
magnitude of 50% for the export tax on chemical exports from Japan to Korea. For the TFP scenario, we 
assume a 0.065% TFP decline in the Korean electronics sector. For convenience of comparison, this TFP 
shock is chosen so that the two scenarios yield the same output fall in the Korean electronics sector.3 While 
the impacts of the two on output of this sector are the same, impacts would differ in other aspects, as 
demonstrated below.  
 
3.2 Simulation Results 
 Running the CGE model with the two scenarios, we find sectoral output changes (Figure 3.1). In 
Korea, electronics sector output would fall by 0.14% in both scenarios, where the TFP shock is tuned to 
yield the same output fall as that from a 50% export tax. As the export tax would hinder chemical product 
imports from Japan, Japanese chemical sector sales would shift towards the domestic market, and Korean 
domestic chemical output would increase to meet Korean electronics sector demand. Output of petroleum 
and coal products would be stimulated through its input-output linkage with the chemical sector. The 
machinery sector would suffer from a supply shortage from the electronics sector, and thus would decrease 
output. 
 The impact on Japanese industries is a mirror image of that on Korean ones. The decline of 
chemical exports would affect Japanese chemical production negatively. The sourcing of chemicals would 
shift to the domestic electronics sector in Japan and thus would increase Japanese electronics output and 
exports. As discussed below, Japanese exports would fill the gap resulting from contraction of export the 
Korean electronics sector. This effect also increases domestic electronics production in Japan. In the TFP 
scenario, the impact on production in both Japan and Korea would be significantly smaller than that under 
the export tax scenario. 
 
                                                          
3 They led to a fall of its output by 0.14%. The details are provided in the Appendix. 
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Figure 3.1: Impacts of Export Tax and TFP Decline on Domestic Output, by Sector 
[Changes from the base, %] 
 
 
 Figure 3.2 shows impact on electronics exports by country. The TFP shock would curb Korean 
production capacity and thus reduce exports by 262 million USD. This gap in the international market 
would be covered by increased exports from Japan and other major four regions, more or less evenly.  
 
Figure 3.2: Impact of TFP Decline on Regional Electronics Exports with Breakdown by Export Destination  
[Unit: mil. USD] 
  
Note: Values are evaluated with Laspeyres prices. 
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its exports by 174 million USD, which is much less than under the TFP scenario (Figure 3.3). Besides, East 
Asia, Southeast Asia, NAFTA, and EU28 would reduce exports by 100–400 mil. USD as a result of the 
marked increase in Japan’s exports, which would be boosted by use of domestic chemical products, whose 
supply destination would shift from Korea as a result of the export tax. 
 
Figure 3.3: Impact of Export Tax on Regional Electronics Exports with Breakdown by Export Destination  
[Unit: mil. USD] 
 
Note: Values are evaluated with Laspeyres prices. 
 
 As the international semiconductor market depends heavily on exports from Korea, suppliers and 
users of Korean electronics products have a serious concern about the consequences of the Japanese 
government policy change. To explore this issue, we examine trade pattern changes from the import side 
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Figure 3.4: Impact of TFP Decline on Regional Electronics Imports with Breakdown by Import Source  
[Unit: mil. USD] 
 
Note: Values are evaluated with Laspeyres prices. 
 
 In the export tax scenario, exports from Japan would substitute for supply not only from Korea 
but also from many other sources (Figure 3.5). Countries other than Japan and Korea would import a greater 
volume of electronics products than previously. 
 
Figure 3.5: Impact of Export Tax on Regional Electronics Imports with Breakdown by Import Source  
[Unit: mil. USD] 
 
Note: Values are evaluated with Laspeyres prices. 
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 The welfare indicator of equivalent variations measures changes in total household consumption 
(Figure 3.6). The TFP shock would have a slightly negative welfare impact on Korea (0.00007% of GDP) 
but little on other countries. The export tax would have significantly larger impacts. Japan would suffer as 
much as Korea would. However, Japan’s economy is much larger than that of Korea, so for a fair 
comparison, we normalize their welfare losses with GDP. Then Korea’s welfare loss, 0.00152% of its GDP, 
is comparable to Japan’s, which is only 0.00034% of its GDP. Other countries would experience a slight 
gain (less than 0.0001% of GDP) as a result of trade diversion. 
 
Figure 3.6: Welfare Impacts of Export Tax and TFP Decline 
[Equivalent Variations, mil. USD] 
 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 This study uses a CGE model to examine impacts of tighter export controls on chemical exports 
from Japan to Korea. As the situation is highly fluid in coverage and depth, we run simulations of two 
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decline in the electronics sector in Korea. Our simulation results show the impacts of the two shocks on 
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 Our scenarios may not be capable of exact projection of the magnitude of these anticipated 
shocks, but it is possible to derive some policy implications qualitatively. If tighter export controls reduced 
the productivity of the Korean electronics sector, the adverse impact would be small in magnitude and range, 
and would not induce chaos in the global market. Rather, if the controls worked as an export tax, which is 
nothing like an export ban, the impacts would be markedly large, harming not only the Korean electronics 
sector but also the Japanese chemical sector and Japanese consumer welfare. There are two notable points 
regarding the latter scenario. First, that large 50% export tax would decrease Korean electronics output by 
only 0.14%. Second, the welfare loss in Japan would ultimately be much smaller than that in Korea because 
of the difference in the size of the two economies. The results suggest that Japan would likely not hesitate 
to tighten export controls, given the current coverage of policy change. 
 We conclude with some remarks about limitations of this study and directions for extension of 
the research. As noted earlier, this study does not rely on any empirical prediction of the direct effects of 
the aforementioned export controls. Such predictions can be only made by observing the actual unfolding 
of the event or similar events; only then could we validate the depth and breadth of the shocks predicted in 
our scenarios. In addition to the scenario issue, there are limitations inherent in our modeling method. While 
the chemical products subject to export controls are narrowly defined in practice, the chemical sector in our 
CGE model is defined on the basis of the GTAP sector, and thus is rather broader. This weak correspondence 
could lead to overestimation of the range of sectors assumed to be impacted. This issue could also be 
impacted by the assumed elasticity parameters in the CES/CET functions. 
 In the current policy context, a change in export control policy could affect a wider range of 
products, with deeper shocks. This is a subject of serious concern to the Korean government. CGE models 
can help us to assess the impacts of these broader policy changes. Our model is constructed with minimal 
features for simplicity, but it can be extended to take into account cross-border capital mobility in the form 
of foreign direct investment, such as that made by Japanese semiconductor companies in Korea and other 
Asian countries. A CGE model with FDI, à la Hosoe (2014), would capture longer-run impacts of the policy 
change on the Japanese and Korean economies. 
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Appendix 
A.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
 As is the case with other modeling methods, our simulation results are dependent on many 
assumptions made in the construction of our model. Simulation results of CGE models are often affected 
by assumptions about elasticity of substitution among goods. In this sensitivity analysis, we examine the 
robustness of our simulation results by perturbing: (1) Armington’s (1969) elasticity of substitution σ 
between imports and domestic goods, which is also used to set the elasticity of transformation between 
exports and domestic goods and the elasticity of substitution/transformation among import sources/export 
destinations by means of the “rule of two” (Liu et al. (2004)); and (2) the elasticity of substitution among 
factor inputs σVA. We run the model under the export tax scenario, doubling and halving the elasticity values 
for the chemical and electronics sectors in all regions assumed in the main body (Table A.1). 
 
Table A.1: Elasticity of Substitution/Transformation Assumed in the Main Body 
 Armington σ Factor input σVA 
Agriculture 2.35 0.25 
Mining 5.70 0.20 
Petroleum and coal products 2.10 1.26 
Chemical 3.30 1.26 
Electronics 4.40 1.26 
Machinery 3.54 1.26 
Other manufacturing 3.26 1.23 
Transportation services 1.90 1.68 
Other services 1.95 1.36 
Source: GTAP Database version 10 
Note: Elasticity values are assumed to be common across countries. 
 
 As different elasticity values lead to different output changes in the Korean electronics sector, 
the TFP scenario in this sensitivity analysis assumes a TFP decline that produces exactly the same output 
change in the export tax scenario. That is, we assume a different TFP decline in each elasticity case (Table 
A.2). Therefore, while the simulation results for cases under the same export tax scenario are comparable, 
comparison of cases under the TFP scenario demands great care. 
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Table A.2: Assumed TFP Changes and Resulting Output Changes in the Korean Electronics Sector with 
Alternative Elasticity Values 
  Assumed TFP Change [%] Output Change [%] 
Base −0.065 −0.137 
σ x2 −0.064 −0.151 
σ x0.5 −0.034 −0.061 
σVA x2 −0.095 −0.261 
σVA x0.5 −0.036 −0.059 
Note: In the base case, presented in the main body, the TFP decline yields the same output decline (0.14%) 
in the Korean electronics sector that would be brought about by imposition of a 50% export tax on chemical 
exports from Japan to Korea. 
 
 Our results are qualitatively the same for output (Figure A.1), exports (Figure A.2), and imports 
(Figure A.3). Welfare impacts are also found robust (Figure A.4). Generally, larger elasticity leads to larger 
trade reactions, but its effects on output and welfare are not necessarily straightforward. While larger 
elasticity gives rise to larger reactions to a shock, it also allows more flexible adjustments to the shock in 
an economy. 
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Figure A.1: Impacts of Export Tax and TFP Decline on Domestic Output  
[Changes from the base, %] 
- Japan 
 
- Korea 
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Figure A.2: Impacts of Export Tax and TFP Decline on Regional Electronics Exports with Breakdown by 
Export Destination  
[Unit: mil. USD] 
[Export Tax Scenario]    [TFP Scenario]     
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Figure A.3: Impacts of Export Tax and TFP Decline on Regional Electronics Imports with Breakdown by 
Import Source  
[Unit: mil. USD] 
[Export Tax Scenario]   [TFP Scenario] 
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Figure A.4: Welfare Impacts of Export Tax and TFP Decline 
[Equivalent Variations, mil. USD] 
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